Book | Chapter

178978

Three theses of l'etre et le neant criticized

Maurice Natanson

pp. 75-92

Abstract

Sartre's concept of freedom is unique: freedom is the condition of the pour-soi; and since the pour-soi exists as "lack," its freedom is the expression of its Nothingness. The pour-soi is what it is not, and is not what it is. This instability defines its freedom. Again, since this is the condition of the pour-soi, man is condemned to his freedom. Man is condemned to be free because man class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">is freedom.

Publication details

Published in:

Natanson Maurice (1973) A critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 75-92

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2410-5_8

Full citation:

Natanson Maurice (1973) Three theses of l'etre et le neant criticized, In: A critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology, Dordrecht, Springer, 75–92.