Book | Chapter
Three theses of l'etre et le neant criticized
pp. 75-92
Abstract
Sartre's concept of freedom is unique: freedom is the condition of the pour-soi; and since the pour-soi exists as "lack," its freedom is the expression of its Nothingness. The pour-soi is what it is not, and is not what it is. This instability defines its freedom. Again, since this is the condition of the pour-soi, man is condemned to his freedom. Man is condemned to be free because man class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">is freedom.
Publication details
Published in:
Natanson Maurice (1973) A critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 75-92
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-2410-5_8
Full citation:
Natanson Maurice (1973) Three theses of l'etre et le neant criticized, In: A critique of Jean-Paul Sartre's ontology, Dordrecht, Springer, 75–92.