The relations which Frege would have called Grundsteine of his system (GRG I, p. 3) are examined. Why should such relations be called logical rather than, for instance, ontological (3.1)? "Subject—predicate" in Frege has a different meaning from that of traditional logic (3.3); traditional philosophy has taken into account facts covered by Frege's UF and UO (3.4). But the most interesting point is what we call hierarchy of predicates, about which our contemporary (Fregean) philosophy of logic has not yet provided a clear statement; traditional logic, to the contrary, was somehow "suffocated" by such a hierarchy of predicates (3.5). Some aspects of the relations between Husserl and Frege are next considered. Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik was still pre-Fregean in matters of predication-theory (3.62), whereas Frege's review of Husserl's book was still pre-Aristotelian, since Frege did not realize that there was a hierarchy of predicates behind Husserl's "psychologism" (3.63).