Book | Chapter
Philosophy and psychiatry
pp. 85-110
Abstract
"Philosophy", wrote R. G. Collingwood, "has this peculiarity, that reflection upon it is part of itself. The theory of poetry may or may not be of service to a poet—opinions on that question have differed—but it is not part of poetry. The theory of science and the theory of history are not parts of science and of history; if scientists and historians study these things, they study them not in their capacity as scientists or historians, but in their capacity as philosophers. But the theory of philosophy is itself a problem for philosophy; and not only a possible problem, but an inevitable problem, one which sooner or later it is bound to raise 1." Any definition of philosophy, then, any effort to determine its proper scope and limits, any attempt to fix its essential task or locate its cardinal questions is itself a philosophic act and reflects, implicitly at least, some order of philosophic commitment. Philosophy is problematic to itself, and the philosopher is involved in a perennial struggle to illuminate the initial paradox of coming to terms with his own discipline. An historical approach to the traditional problems of philosophy is a science of beginnings, it is a radical attempt to re-view again and again the question of what it means to have a world, to be in a world, and to wonder about one's experience of a world. The triad of questioner, question, and the questioned may provide a clue to the unique dimension of philosophic concern.
Publication details
Published in:
(1969) Psychiatry and philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.
Pages: 85-110
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-87984-5_2
Full citation:
Natanson Maurice (1969) Philosophy and psychiatry, In: Psychiatry and philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 85–110.