Book | Chapter

211694

Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

Michael Wohlgemuth

pp. 279-301

Abstract

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also — and even more so — characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.

Publication details

Published in:

Mueller Dennis C., Cantner Uwe (2001) Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century: proceedings of the international Joseph A. Schumpeter society conference, Vienna 1998 "capitalism and socialism in the 21st century". Heidelberg, Physica.

Pages: 279-301

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-11287-8_14

Full citation:

Wohlgemuth Michael (2001) „Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly“, In: D. C. Mueller & U. Cantner (eds.), Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century, Heidelberg, Physica, 279–301.