Since the publication of Richard Gale's anthology on The Philosophy of Time (1967), and his original work, The Language of Time (1968), and especially since D. H. Mellor's Real Time (1981), the literature on the philosophy of time has flourished.¹ Part of the reason for this renewed interest in the philosophy of time concerns its connection with many other issues in the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science and metaphysics. In Michael Tooley's case, it was his research on the nature of causation that led him to a consideration of the nature of time and the debate between the dynamic (or tensed) and the static (or tenseless) views of time. In his book, Causation: A Realist Approach (1987) Tooley argued for a causal analysis of the direction of time and in Time, Tense, and Causation (1997) he argues that a full account of the relation between causation and time is even deeper since events can be causally related only in a dynamic world; a world in which the past and present are real, but the future is not. The version of the "non-existent future" theory of time that Tooley endorses is original and in various ways quite unlike more traditional tensed theories. He espouses some theses that have hitherto been rejected by tensers, for example, "that tenseless concepts and facts are more basic than tensed ones' (1997, p. 29), but he argues for them very carefully.