On synchronic dogmatism
pp. 3677-3693
Abstract
Saul Kripke (Philosophical troubles, 2011) argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism (i.e., the view that, if one knows that p, then one may rationally decide now to disregard any future evidence against p one may encounter). According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.
Publication details
Published in:
Jantzen Benjamin C., Mayo Deborah G., Patton Lydia (2015) Ontology & methodology. Synthese 192 (11).
Pages: 3677-3693
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-015-0715-3
Full citation:
Borges Rodrigo (2015) „On synchronic dogmatism“. Synthese 192 (11), 3677–3693.