Radical anti-realism, Wittgenstein and the length of proofs
pp. 419-432
Abstract
After sketching an argument for radical anti-realism that does not appeal to human limitations but polynomial-time computability in its definition of feasibility, I revisit an argument by Wittgenstein on the surveyability of proofs, and then examine the consequences of its application to the notion of canonical proof in contemporary proof-theoretical-semantics.
Publication details
Published in:
Kallestrup Jesper, Pritchard Duncan (2009) The philosophy of Crispin Wright. Synthese 171 (3).
Pages: 419-432
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-008-9315-9
Full citation:
Marion Mathieu (2009) „Radical anti-realism, Wittgenstein and the length of proofs“. Synthese 171 (3), 419–432.