The task of critical evaluation carries with it an immense responsibility. Criticism is not simply dissection; it presupposes a genuine attempt to gain an internal understanding. Even if we finally decide that Jaspers failed in this attempt, there is little question about the authenticity of the attempt itself. With Heidegger the situation is somewhat different. It is clear from the beginning that Heidegger is not so much interested in Nietzsche for his own sake as he is in Nietzsche as an illustration of his thesis about the historical unfolding of the nature of metaphysics. Thus, part of our responsibility in attempting a critical evaluation of Heidegger and Jaspers is a recognition of the fundamental aims of their interpretations. This does not mean that we are compelled to accept their aims, but we must take these aims into account if we are to understand fully the nature of Heidegger's and Jaspers' interpretive projects.