In the preceding chapters we have tried to show, by means of an examination of the interpretations of Jaspers and Heidegger, the negative consequences of attempting an interpretation of Nietzsche without having first taken into account the essential dualism in Nietzsche's theory of man which constitutes the core of his philosophy. In fact, it is precisely because Jaspers and Heidegger have basically ignored this dualism that they can arrive at two radically different interpretations. Certain aspects of these interpretations are so starkly in opposition, that one sometimes wonders if they are both talking about the same philosopher. One of the best illustrations of this opposition is to be found in a comparison between Heidegger's derivation of truth from homoiosis and Jaspers' explication of truth as contradiction in the form of vicious circularity. Heidegger seizes on the metaphysical or cosmological pole of the dualism, and Jaspers on the pole of philosophical anthropology. For Heidegger, all of Nietzsche's philosophy can be subsumed under metaphysics and, for Jaspers, what cannot be subsumed under philosophical anthropology is either aberrant or more or less irrelevant.